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lN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
LYNDA M. JENNINGS,
Plriintiff-Appellant,
VS.

Case No.

JACK C. MAHONEY, Director, Financial Responsibility Division, Department of Public Safety, State of Utah,

12171

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Respondent, on April ::.9. 1970, after reviewing
all pertinent information as required by statute, determined
there was a possibility of appellant's culpability and ordered the driver's license of appellant Lynda Jennings revoked, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-5 (1970). The
appellant challenged the order and the case was heard before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge of the Third
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, District Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
Cmmt.v, State of Utah, on the 8th of June, 1970, affirmed
ilie order issued by the respondent requinng the appellant

to forego her driver's license or p0st security in the amount
of $241.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT

APPEAL

Respondent submits that the order requiring suspension of appellant's driver's license or a posting of a bond
for $241.00 be affirmed.
STATEMENT

or

FACTS

On March 16, 1970, Lynda M. Jennings and Roy W.
Young collided while driving their respective automobiles.
The accident occurred at 25.3 Center Street, and Officer
William C. Duncan cited the appellant, Lynda M. Jennings,
for "starting in traffic," a violation of 201 of the Traffic
Code. Officer Duncan, Mr. Young and appellant all filed
separate reports of the accident as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-35 (1970) (Exhibit 3-D). The reports indicated
that Mr. Young's car was damaged in excess of $100.00 and
that Miss Jennings, the appellant, had no automobile liability insurance (Exhibit 3-D). Pursuant to the Safety Responsibility Act, Utah Code Ann., Title 41, Chapter 12
(1970), the respondent, Jack C. Mahoney, Director of the
Financial Responsibility Division, wrote the appellant on
April 29, 1970, stating that unless the appellant posted bond
for $241.00 (estimated cost of repair to Mr. Young's car)
in one of the ways specified in the letter, her driver's license
would be revoked May 14, 1970 (Exhibit 3-D).
On May 12, 1970, attorney for appellant filed a complaint and motion for an order of f'.tay on the revocation of
the driver's license which was granted by Judge Hall. On

May 22, 1970, Judge D. Frank W1lk•ns of the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
had a hearing on the matter.
At the hearing, counsel for appellant offered appellant's testimony and requested a c.:,ntinuance to get the testimony of Officer Duncan (T. 29). (Apparently counsel
had failed to give the subpoena for Officer Duncan to the
P,1Jice Department until the night before the hearing, and
as a result, the police officer w<1.s not present.) Respondent's counsel offered the reports of Officer Duncan, Mr.
Young, and appellant into evide1'!ce and elicited the testimony of the respondent. On this evidence, Judge Wilkins
ruled that Mr. Mahoney, the respor.dent, had not abused his
discretion. Appellant was then permitted a proffer of proof
for the record. It is from this hearing that appellant is
appealing.

POINT I.
THE SUSPENSION OF LYNDA M. JENNINGS'
DRIVER'S LICENSE DID .NOT VIOLATE DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
The procedure outlined m Ui:ah Code Ann. § 41-12-2
and 41-12-5 (1970) and followed by respondent, does not
violate due process. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12-5(a) and (b)
( 1970) provide that the Commission must base their decision on all reports or other evidence rnbmitted to the
Commission.

Pursuant to the above
statute, the respondent, before making any decision, received and looked over
appellant's accident report, Mr. Young's accident report,
and the investigating officer's report. These reports, under
Simmons v. State Dept. of Public Safety, Case No. 11771
(1970), are considered competent and valid evidence. On the
basis of these reports, the respondent, under Hague v. State
Dept. of Public Safety, 23 Utah 2d 209, 462 P. 2d 418
(1968) determined whether or not there was the possibility
of appellant's culpability. Mr. Mahoney concluded that the
appellant could
been at fault and th0refore issued an
order suspending her driver's license. Once the order was
issued, the appellant had and took advantage of the opportunity to petition a district
Utah Code Ann. § 4112-2 (b) (1970) states:
" ( b) Any person aggrieved by an order or
an act of the commission, may, within ten days
after notice thereof, file a petition in the district
court for a review thereof; but the filing of such
petition shall not suspend the
or act unless a
stay thereof shall be allowed by a judge of said
court pending final determination of the review. The
court shall summarily hear the petition and may
make any appropriate order or decree."
The appellant was also granted stay on the execution of the
order pending the outcome in the district court (R. 6).
There is no reason why this procedur3 outlined by statute and Utah Supreme Court decISions violates due process.
Due process does not require that judicial inquiry be made
before the discretion of an admrnistrative official can be
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exercised and there is no j udic1ally or expressly defined
form of procedure that need he followed. As stated in Inland Em1rire Dist. Council, Lumber and Sawmill Workers
Union, Lewiston, Idaho v. Mills,
U. S. 697 (1945) :
"The requirements imposed by constitutional
guaranty of due process
not technical, nor is
any particular form of procedure necessary, and
the guaranty does not require a hearing ai the initial stage or any particular point or at more than
one point in an administrative proceeding so long
as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective." Id.
710.
The only thing required by du•..; process in an administrative decision is that the person being accused or deprived
have an opportunity to be heard:
"Where a preliminary decisi.1n by ar.. agency
is a step in an administrative proceeding, no hearing at preliminary stage i::> l equired by due process,
as long as requisite hearing is held before final administrative order becomes effective." Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry,
U. S. 595 at 598
(1950).
The appellant was given and used the opportunity to
be heard in the district court. Stati:: law and Utah Supreme
Court decisions require a person rn appellant's situation to
have an opportunity to be heard i11 court. See Utah Code
Ann. § 41-12-2 (b) (1970) and Tl ague v. State Dept. of
P11blic Safetu, supra. Lynda Jennings appeared m court
and was heard by Judge D. Frank Wilkins. Judge Wilkins,
under the guidelines of Hague v. State Dept. of Public
Srifety, supra, which states ''the court should determine
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whether the administrative body exceeded this jurisdiction
or acted capriciously," Id. at 302, determined that the respondent did not act capriciously or exceed its jurisdiction.
The procedure outlined in the Fin.ancial Responsibility Act,
as followed by respondent and Jud;;e Wili:ins, does not violate due process.
Appellant attacks the failure to satisfy due process in
specific areas. She alleges first, that she was denied an
administrative hearing. As
out earlier in the brief,
it does not matter if appellant wa..> heard at the administratrative hea1:ing - it only matters if the nppellant receives
the opportunity to be heard before the administrative decision becomes final. Appellant received that opportunity.
As stated in Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416
P. 2d 46 (1966) :
"Suspension without prior hearing of driver's
license by commissioner of law enforcement for
failure to deposit sum required as security for satisfaction of any judgment v,'hich might be recovered
against uninsured driver for damage resulting from
accident did not deny him due process, where the
law authorizing suspension providBd for ju<licial review of action of commissioner." Id. at 49.
Besides the administrative dP.cision was made by the
respondent under the auspices of the constitution. The respondent considered all the facts, he received a report submitted by the appellant, a report by the other party involved in the accident, and a report by a neutral party, the
investigating police officer. The report that the appellant
filed had just as much weight for consideration as the other
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reports ·which were filed and ia th 'J sense, due process was
served.
Appellant next attacks the judicial hearing itself,
claiming that the hearing was a dmial of due proce:ss bee:wse it was placed on the law aP.J motion calendar. The
tn)e of motions scheduled on a particular day have no bearing on whether or not due proceJs was followed. There is
no basis in arguing that because the hearing was held on
Jaw and motion day, due proces" was not followed. The
important factor is whether the appellan: had a chance to
be heard in court. It does not follow that a person who had
a hearing on law and motion r:lay was deprived of due process. This court in Toleman v. S-;,U Lake County, 20 Utah
2d 310, 437 P. 2d 442 (1968) stated the requisites for due
process:
"Our feeling pretty much is expressed in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, [299 U S. 306
(1950) ], where it was said:
'The fundamental requisite of due process
of law is the opportunity to be heard'" Id. at
448.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seem to support
this doctrine. The rules state tha': a trial must be held in
open court but that a hearing can be conducted anywhere
by a district court judge as long as it is within the county
where the matter is pending.
77(b), Utah Code Ann.
(1953) :

"(b) All trials upon the merits shall be conducted in open court and 1'':• far as convenient in a
regular court room. All other acts or proceedings
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may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers,
without the attendance of the clerk or other comt
officials and at any place within the state, either
within or without the district; but no hearing, other
than one ex parte, shall b<.) conducted outside the
county wherein the matter is pending without the
consent of all the partie.3 to the action affected
thereby."
Miss Jennings had a hearing which was conducted in open
court and according to the rules of civil procedure.
Appellant's third contention is that her counsel was
unable to interrogate Officer Duncan. Counsel for appellant has no one to blame but his c,'vn neglect for not being
able to interrogate Officer
in court. Counsel for
appellant alleges that attorneys fur respondent told him,
before the hearing, that he would not be allowed to call
witnesses. Yet, if that statement
correct, why did counsel for appellant subpoena Officer Duncan the day before
the trial, and then admit at trial that he was delinquent in
not issuing the subpoena earlier? ( T. 29). The complaint
was filed by appellant on May 12, 1970 (T. 12) and the
hearing was held on May 22, 1970. That gave counsel for
appellant ten days to subpoemi Officer Duncan and assure
his appearance in court. Besides, bc)th Mr. Hansen and Mr.
Young stated in court that they did not object to Officer
Duncan being called to testify :
MR. HANSEN: There has been a mistake in his
understanding. That's not the position of the state.
* * * We have no objedion at all if the i11aintiff in this matter wishes to call witnesses ....

MR. DOLOWITZ: Your Honor, maybe I'm blaming
Mr. Hansen for Mr. Your_g's point of view, Mr.
Young being counsel with him.
MR. YOUNG: Our po::;ition was that it was discretionary issue as to whether the department had
properly exercised its authority
revoke on the
basis of the information before it. It does11't go to
stipulating that no one
be called as witnesses,
or anything like that (T. 15, 16).
The fact of the matter is that counsel for appellant failed
to either follow up on his subpoena or issue it earlier, and
that is the only reason why
Duncan was not available to testify. Error on the part of appellant does not
mean he was denied due process. Appellant cannot fail to
call a witness and then turn around and allege his constitutional rights were denied becam-'c that witness was not
present.
Appellant's last contention is that there was not sufficient time given for her attorney to subpoena necessary
witnesses. As indicated earlier, appellant had ten days in
which to subpoena all necessary witnesses. (Complamt filed
May 12, 1970, hearing held May .'.:'.2, 1970.) There was ample opportunity for appellant's counsel to subpoena witnesses and abide by McAnerney v. State, 9 Utah 2d 191,
34 P. 2d 212 (1959), which requfrc& the opportunity by the
defendant to subpoena witnesses. The respondent submits
no one but the appellant and ;1er counsel are to blame for
not subpoenaing all necessary witnesses.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant, Lynda M.
was given a full
hearing in compliance with dn° process of law, and found
guilty of violating Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-5(b) (1970).
On this basis, respondent submits that the district court decision suspending appellant's dri ve1 's license be affirmed.
Respectfully sulimitted,
VERNON 13. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for

